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THE IMPACT ON SECURITIZATION OF REVISED UCC
ARTICLE 9
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ*
The recent revisions of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code ("UCC") are expected to have a significant impact on securiti-
zation-a type of financing that is perhaps the most rapidly growing
segment of the U.S. credit markets and increasingly a major part of
foreign credit markets. In its current form, Article 9 governs the sale
of only certain types of assets that are involved in securitization
transactions. Revised Article 9 attempts to broaden its coverage to
virtually all securitized assets. I analyze how it does that and what it
means for Article 9 to apply to these transactions, addressing issues of
perfection and priority of asset transfers, commingling of proceeds,
assignability of assets in the face of contractual restrictions, and the
effect of negative pledge covenants. Finally, I show that the revisions
of Article 9 do much to bring the commercial law setting for
securitization into the twenty-first century.
INTRODUCTION
Asset securitization is "by far the most rapidly growing segment
of the U.S. credit markets"1 and increasingly is becoming a major part
of foreign credit markets.2 In a typical securitization, a company
(usually referred to as the "originator"' ) sells rights in income-
* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law; Faculty Director, Duke Global
Capital Markets Center; and Special Counsel to Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler. E-
mail: schwarcz@law.duke.edu. Copyright © 1999 by Steven L. Schwarcz. The author thanks
Bruce Bernstein, Carl Bjerre, Jason Kravitt, Eric Marcus, Sandra Rocks, and Ed Smith for
helpful comments on a draft of this article.
1. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 24 (1996).
2. See generally Symposium, International Issues in Cross-Border Securitization and
Structured Finance, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 229 (1998) (bringing together leading scholars
and practitioners from the private and public sectors to examine these issues). These articles
also are available on-line at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/djcilU. For a discussion of the
fundamental legal principles of cross-border securitization and finance, see Steven L. Schwarcz,
The Universal Language of Cross-Border Finance, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 235 (1998).
3. References in this article to originator, company, or debtor (the generic term favored
by Article 9) will generally mean the originator in a securitization transaction.
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producing or financial assets4-such as accounts, instruments, lease
rentals, franchise and license fees, and other intangible rights to
payment-to a special purpose vehicle ("SPV"). The SPV, in turn,
issues securities to capital market investors and uses the proceeds of
the issuance to pay for the assets.5 The investors, who are repaid from
collections of the assets, buy the securities based on their assessment
of the value of the assets. Because the SPV (and no longer the
originator) owns the assets, their investment decision often can be
made without concern for the originator's financial condition. Thus,
viable companies that otherwise cannot obtain financing because of a
weakened financial condition now can do so. Even companies that
otherwise could obtain financing now will be able to obtain lower-cost
capital market financing.6
What does Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code have to
do with securitization? In its current form, Article 9, which generally
addresses only secured transactions, nonetheless governs the sale of
certain types of financial assets - accounts and chattel paper - that are
commonly involved in securitization transactions.7 The rationale for
including sales of these assets in Article 9 was that "[c]ommercial
financing on the basis of accounts and chattel paper is often so
conducted that the distinction between a security transfer and a sale is
blurred, and a sale of such property is therefore covered ... whether
intended for security or not. '8 This same rationale, and the significant
4. The reader should not confuse my use of the securitization term "financial assets" with
the unrelated term "financial asset" used in UCC Article 8 (and defined in UCC section
8-102(a)(9)).
5. For authorities on securitization generally, see TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION:
STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSET POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES (1991
& Supp. 1999); STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES
OF ASSET SECURITIZATION (2d ed. 1993); THE SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS (Jason
H.P. Kravitt ed., 2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 1999); Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and
Corporate Risk Allocation, 72 TULANE L. REV. 101 (1997); Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A
Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061 (1996); and Steven L. Schwarcz, The
Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STANFORD J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133 (1994).
6. Securitization has an increasingly international focus in part because companies that
wish to raise funds from the capital markets may not be located in countries with established
capital markets or because developing capital markets lack the depth of developed markets in
other countries. In order to access capital market funding, those companies will have to
structure deals that cross their national borders. See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 236-37.
7. Current UCC section 9-102(1)(b) provides that Article 9 applies "to any sale of
accounts or chattel paper." (Subsequent references in this article to a current section of UCC
Article 9 will simply refer to that "Current" section, and subsequent references in this article to
a revised section of UCC Article 9 will simply refer to that "Revised" section.) The implicit
assumption is that a given transfer either is intended for security and is, therefore, a secured
transaction or else is a sale, and that Article 9 will govern both such transfers.
8. U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 2.
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minimization of transaction costs that the rule achieves,9 holds equally
true today.
What has changed today, however, is that, increasingly, many
other types of financial assets are sold as part of commercial financing
transactions. Whereas factoring10 was the only significant form of
commercial financing to involve sales of financial assets (accounts and
chattel paper) when the UCC originally was adopted," securitiza-
tion-which involves the sale of a whole range of financial assets-
has now become significant. Yet, Article 9 had not been amended to
take securitization into account. Revised Article 9 is a bold and
largely successful attempt to remedy that omission and to adapt the
law governing secured transactions to the realities of modern
commercial and financial transactions. It accomplishes these goals in
several ways.
I. REVISED ARTICLE 9 BRINGS THE SALE OF MOST TYPES OF
FINANCIAL ASSETS WITHIN ITS SCOPE
As a threshold matter, Revised Article 9 brings within its scope
the sale not only of accounts and chattel paper, as under current law,
but also of "payment intangibles" and "promissory notes."' 2
Significantly for securitization, the definition of an account is
expanded from current law to include not only credit card
receivables 3 and health-care-insurance receivables 14 but also any
9. Transaction costs are minimized for several reasons. Parties do not have to make the
difficult determination of whether each transfer is a secured transaction or a sale. Also, filing for
both types of transfers will forestall litigation attempting to second-guess that determination if
the debtor eventually goes bankrupt. Finally, pre-UCC sales of accounts had to be perfected
under the common law procedures of the state where the seller was located. See SCHWARCZ,
supra note 5, at 38-39. Different states had different rules and some required the account
debtors to be notified of the sale. See id. Notification of numerous account debtors always
would be costly and often would be impractical, creating uncertainty in the latter case as to the
buyer's ownership rights in the accounts and sometimes discouraging the sale altogether. See id.
at 39. Inclusion of sales of accounts and chattel paper in Article 9 circumvents those common
law requirements.
10. For an introduction to factoring, see PETER H. WEIL, ASSET-BASED LENDING: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SECURED FINANCING § 2.3 (3d ed. 1998). For a discussion of the
relationship between factoring and securitization, see Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 144-46.
11. See 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 8.7, at 275,
§ 10.5, at 308 (1965) (explaining that the inclusion of sales in Article 9 was necessary to protect
"arrangements of the factoring type").
12. See Revised section 9-109(a)(3), the successor provision to Current UCC section
9-102(1)(b) (defining scope).
13. See R. § 9-102(a)(2)(vii) (including within the definition of an "account" rights to
payment arising out of the use of a credit or charge card).
14. Revised section 9-102(a)(2) provides that "[tihe term [account] includes health-care-
insurance receivables," a term itself defined in Revised section 9-102(a)(46) to mean "an
.949
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"right to payment ... for property that has been or is to be ...
licensed, assigned, or otherwise disposed of,"'5 thereby covering
license and franchise fee receivables. Moreover, the term payment
intangible is broadly defined as "a general intangible under which the
account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary obligation.' 1 6 This
definition appears intended to cover financial assets that are not
already covered by the terms account, chattel paper, and promissory
notes. For example, loan participations and commercial loans not
evidenced by instruments 7 would be payment intangibles.
Accordingly, Revised Article 9 will apply to securitization
transactions so long as the financial assets being sold consist of
accounts (including credit card, health-care-insurance, license, and
franchise fee receivables), chattel paper, promissory notes, or
payment intangibles. I will refer to these types of financial assets as
"covered financial assets." The reader should note, however, that in
some securitization transactions, financial assets are not sold but are
merely transferred as security. 18 Revised Article 9 then will apply, as
does Current Article 9, to virtually any financial asset so transferred. 9
The remainder of this article discusses what it means for Article
9 to apply to the securitization of financial assets. Most significantly,
all sales of covered financial assets will be perfected, and the priority
of the SPV as against creditors or a trustee in bankruptcy of the
originator will be governed, by the rules of Article 9. Establishing
clear and pragmatic rules for perfection and priority of the transfer of
covered financial assets will minimize transaction costs for the
reasons previously explained in the context of transferring accounts
interest in or claim under a policy of insurance which is a right to payment of a monetary
obligation for health-care goods or services provided." In that connection, Article 9's traditional
insurance exclusion no longer will exclude "an assignment by ... a health-care provider of a
health-care-insurance receivable." Id. § 9-109(d)(8).
15. Id. § 9-102(a)(2)(i).
16. Id. § 9-102(a)(61). The term general intangible is defined in Revised section
9-102(a)(42).
17. These being financial assets that are often transferred in collateralized loan obligation
transactions.
18. See Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 135, 140 n.26 (observing that whereas originators often
structure the transfer of financial assets as a "true sale" in order to achieve bankruptcy
remoteness, the transfer of financial assets from an investment grade originator to the SPV need
not be structured as a sale).
19. See R. § 9-109(a)(1) (providing that Revised Article 9 applies to any "transaction,
regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in personal property or fixtures by
contract"). Subsections (c) and (d) of section 9-109 contain certain exclusions from Revised
Article 9, few of which relate to securitization transactions. And even though Revised Article 9
does not apply to security interests in (non-fixture) real property, it does apply to security
interests in obligations secured by real property, such as mortgage loans. See id. § 9-109(b).
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and chattel paper: parties to the securitization transaction will not
have to make the difficult determination of whether each transfer of a
covered financial asset is a secured transaction or a sale; filing for
both types of transfers will forestall litigation attempting to second-
guess that determination if the originator in the securitization
transaction eventually goes bankrupt; and sales of covered financial
assets no longer will have to be perfected under state common law
procedures that often are costly and impractical. 0
But Revised Article 9 will apply to securitization in a myriad of
other ways. In this article, I focus on the more significant impacts
most likely to be encountered in a typical securitization transaction,
such as mitigating the effect of commingling proceeds of financial
assets and promoting assignability of financial assets, notwithstanding
contractual restrictions to the contrary. The reader must recognize,
however, that Revised Article 9 will have other impacts on securitiza-
tion, some less significant, 21 some that will be significant in only
certain transactions,22 and some whose significance might not become
obvious until transactions are actually done under the revised
statute.23
Of course, the fact that Revised Article 9 will apply to the sale of
covered financial assets does not mean that Article 9 applies to those
sales for all purposes. In interpreting Oklahoma's enactment of
Current Article 9, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals previously had
concluded that Article 9's application to the sale of accounts-
characterizing the buyer of accounts as a "secured party," the seller as
a "debtor," and the sold accounts as "collateral"-means that
accounts cannot be sold under Oklahoma law.24 Although that
20. Cf supra note 9 (explaining why the inclusion in Article 9 of accounts and chattel paper
reduces the transaction costs of transferring those assets).
21. For example, Revised section 9-209(c) sensibly provides that certain duties of a secured
party that arise when a secured obligation is repaid do not apply to sales of covered financial
assets, and Revised section 9-323(c) sensibly provides that certain priority rules regarding future
advances also do not apply to such sales.
22. Such as the ability to take a security interest in a deposit account under Revised section
9-304 or the rules for bank setoff against such deposit account under Revised section 9-340.
23. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry into the Statutory Rulemaking
Process of Private Legislatures, 29 GA. L. REV. 909, 918 & n.23 (1995) (discussing that a Revised
Article 9 can raise new problems of interpretation).
24. See Octagon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Rimmer, 995 F.2d 948, 955 (10th Cir. 1993). Octagon Gas
Systems, which had sold the accounts, went bankrupt, and federal bankruptcy law looks to state
law to determine whether an asset has been sold. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55
(1979) (holding that property rights are determined by state law and the involvement of an
interested party in a bankruptcy proceeding has no effect on these rights).
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decision was much criticized, 25 and the Permanent Editorial Board of
the UCC issued a commentary stating that the case was incorrect 2 6
and also amended comment 2 to Current section 9-102 to clarify
interpretation,27 those actions have not generally been approved by
legislatures or courts and do not necessarily have the force of law.28
Revised Article 9, once approved by legislatures, is intended to drive
the final nail into the Octagon coffin by providing not only that the
question "whether a debtor's rights in collateral may be voluntarily or
involuntarily transferred is governed by law other than this article
[9],"29 but also that a "debtor that has sold an account, chattel paper,
payment intangible, or promissory note does not retain a legal or
equitable interest in the collateral sold."30 The latter point attempts to
address the "rarified" argument that Octagon was correctly decided
because certain limited property interests may remain with the
originator after the sale of financial assets.31
25. See, e.g., Thomas E. Plank, Sacred Cows and Workhorses: The Sale of Accounts and
Chattel Paper Under the U. C. C. and the Effects of Violating a Fundamental Drafting Principle, 26
CONN. L. REV. 397 (1994); Steven L. Schwarcz, "Octagon Gas" Ruling Creates Turmoil for
Commercial and Asset-Based Finance, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 4, 1993, at 1.
26. See PEB COMMENTARY NO. 14, TRANSFER OF ACCOUNTS OR CHATTEL PAPER (1994)
(referring to the Octagon decision as "erroneous" and noting that "[t]o the extent the [Octagon]
court relied on Article 9 in reaching its determination, this Commentary adopts a contrary
position").
27. PEB Commentary No. 14 amended comment 2 to Current section 9-102 to read in part
as follows:
Neither Section 9-102 nor any other provision of Article 9 is intended to prevent
the transfer of ownership of accounts or chattel paper. The determination of whether a
particular transfer of accounts or chattel paper constitutes a sale or a transfer for
security purposes (such as in connection with a loan) is not governed by Article 9....
The use of terminology such as ... "collateral" to include accounts or chattel paper
that have been sold is intended solely as a drafting technique ... and is not relevant to
the sale or secured transaction determination.
28. Only three states have addressed Octagon head-on by amending Current Article 9.
Oklahoma and Utah added a new subsection (4) to section 9-102, see OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A,
§ 9-102 (Supp. 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-9-102 (1997), and Texas added new language to
section 9-102(a)(2), see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.102 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999), in
each case clarifying that the application of Article 9 to sales of accounts and chattel paper does
not affect sale characterization. Even before those amendments, however, the practical effect of
Octagon may have been limited to transactions undertaken by originators located in the Tenth
Circuit. See Plank, supra note 25, at 459 n.278 (observing that rating agencies ignore the
Octagon case when the originator is outside the Tenth Circuit).
29. R. § 9-401. For an analysis of that other applicable law, see SCHWARCZ, supra note 5, at
28-35.
30. R. § 9-318(a).
31. See David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of Securitization, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1055, 1059-61 (1998) (characterizing this argument as rarified). Revised sections 9-207(d)
and 9-601(g) address the same point by providing that the secured party as a buyer of accounts,
chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes generally owes no duty to the debtor
regarding the collateral. There is, however, a potential ambiguity in the language of Revised
section 9-318(a). By stating that "a debtor that has sold an account, chattel paper, payment
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II. REVISED ARTICLE 9 ESTABLISHES CLEAR AND PRAGMATIC
RULES FOR PERFECTION AND PRIORITY
Two of the essential goals of a commercial law statute are
clarity3" and simplicity of implementation.33 In the context of the
commercial law rules for perfection and priority, Revised Article 9
furthers both of these goals.
A. Perfection
Perfection refers to the protection of a transferee's interest in
transferred assets from creditors of the transferor and from the
transferor's trustee in bankruptcy.34  Under Current Article 9,
perfection is generally achieved by filing financing statements in
jurisdictions where the debtor (originator) or the collateral is
located.3" The problem, however, is that it is often unclear where the
debtor and the collateral are located and, in the latter case, the
location may well change.
Revised Article 9 addresses this problem in two ways: by making
the location of the debtor-as opposed to the location of the
collateral-determine the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection
in most cases;36 and by clarifying where a debtor is deemed to be
located.37 The former point is less critical to securitization, which
involves intangibles, than to other forms of secured financing where
intangible, or promissory note does not retain a legal or equitable interest in the collateral sold,"
it invites a court to find that when the debtor is in fact shown to have retained a legal or
equitable interest, there is no sale under state law. Perhaps Revised section 9-318 or its
comments should be amended to clarify that is not the intention.
32. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 23, at 928 ("A statute ... governing commercial law ...
should be clear. Clarity is important to minimize mistakes, ambiguities, and resulting disputes
and litigation. Clarity also helps to preserve expectations, which is essential to market
transactions."); see also Security Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Dentsply Prof'l Plan, 617 P.2d 1340,
1343 (Okla. 1980) ("Although strict adherence to [Uniform Commercial Code] requirements
may at times lead to harsh results, efforts by courts to fashion equitable solutions for mitigation
of hardships experienced by creditors in the literal application of statutory filing requirements
may have the undesirable effect of reducing the degree of reliance the market place should be
able to place on the Code provisions. The inevitable harm doubtless would be more serious to
commerce than the occasional harshness from strict obedience.").
33. See Schwarcz, supra note 23, at 939 ("Simplicity of implementation.., has two aspects.
First, it should be simple to understand how to apply commercial law. In this sense, simplicity is
related to the principle of clarity, which maintains that the law should be straightforward,
unambiguous, and clear. Second, the implementation of commercial law should be practical and
cost-effective." (footnote omitted)).
34. See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 240 & n.19 (defining perfection).
35. See U.C.C. §§ 9-103, 9-302, 9-401.
36. See R. §§ 9-301(1), 9-305(c).
37. See id. § 9-307.
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the assets are tangible items that can be moved around. But the latter
point is quite significant to securitization. Section 9-307 of Revised
Article 9 changes the rule of Current section 9-103(3) to provide that
registered organizations, such as corporations, organized under the
law of a particular state are deemed to be located in that state.38 Thus,
one would file financing statements against an originator
incorporated under the laws of Delaware in Delaware, irrespective of
where the originator's assets or business are located. 9 Furthermore,
where the originator is a foreign company not incorporated under
state law, Revised Article 9 provides that its location is in the foreign
jurisdiction where the originator has its chief executive office (or, if
the originator has only one place of business, in the jurisdiction where
that place is located), but only if that jurisdiction itself has a public
filing system for perfection. ° If that jurisdiction does not have a
public filing system, the originator is deemed to be located in the
District of Columbia.4 Of course, whether filing in the District of
Columbia will achieve perfection under the law of the foreign
jurisdiction is also a question of that jurisdiction's law.42
Revised Article 9 also brings a measure of pragmatism to the se-
curitization of payment obligations evidenced by instruments. Under
current law, a security interest in instruments can only be perfected
by taking possession of the instrument. 43 That may be impractical,
however, where (as is common) a securitization transaction involves
the transfer of large pools of instruments. The revision solves that
38. See id. § 9-307(e). This does not completely eliminate the problem that the filing
location would change if the debtor reincorporates in another state, but that rarely happens.
39. Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 23, at 968 & n.215 (arguing that "[i]n this age where personal
computers and telefaxes permit executives to work at home, bricks and mortar no longer are the
sole determinants of a company's location" and that "it sometimes may be costly to verify the
location of a small business or to monitor whether the business remains in that location"; and
therefore recommending an easier filing location, such as "the state of the debtor's
organization"). See also Lynn M. LoPucki, Why the Debtor's State of Incorporation Should Be
the Proper Place for Article 9 Filing: A Systems Analysis, 79 MINN. L. REV. 577, 638-45 (1995)
(arguing that a state of incorporation rule should not significantly alter the distribution of filing
revenues among states).
40. See R. § 9-307(b)-(c).
41. See id. § 9-307(c). For a discussion of the merits and rationale of this rule, see Carl S.
Bjerre, International Project Finance Transactions: Selected Issues Under Revised Article 9, 73
AM. BANKR. L.J. 261,271-75 (1999).
42. Compare the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL") proposed Convention on Assignment in Receivables Financing, 28 U.N.
Comm'n on Int'l Trade L. Y.B. (1998) (discussed in Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 240 & n.21, and
in Spiro V. Bazinas, An International Legal Regime for Receivables Financing: UNCITRAL's
Contribution, 8 DuKE J. CoMP. & INT'L L. 315, 320 (1998)), which provides that the law of the
assignor's location governs perfection of cross-border receivables financings.
43. See U.C.C. §§ 9-304(1), 9-305.
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problem by allowing a security interest in instruments to be perfected
by filing.44 Nonetheless, holders in due course and certain other
purchasers for value of instruments would have priority on the
rationale that requiring them to check the filing system in connection
with each purchase would impede those transactions, whereas there is
only "a remote possibility that is not of serious concern" that an
originator will voluntarily transfer instruments to third parties in
breach of contractual restrictions.45
One of the major controversies that arose during the Article 9
revision effort was how to perfect the sale of payment intangibles.
Bankers were concerned that a perfection requirement of filing
financing statements would subject them to costly new procedures
when selling loan participations, a form of payment intangible. 46 A
somewhat practical solution was reached to mitigate this concern: the
sale of payment intangibles would be deemed to be automatically
perfected, without the need to file financing statements. 47 This
solution, however, is imperfect. Buyers of payment intangibles cannot
search filing records to determine whether those intangibles
previously have been sold to others. Thus, an SPV in a securitization
transaction cannot ascertain the priority (discussed below) of the
SPV's ownership rights, other than by relying on representations of
the originator. Originators that are insufficiently capitalized to back
up their representations therefore may find it difficult to securitize
payment intangibles.
44. See R. § 9-312(a).
45. See PEB STUDY GROUP, PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIF. COMMERCIAL
CODE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 REPORT 155 (Dec. 1, 1992) [hereinafter PEB
REPORT]; Schwarcz, supra note 23, at 970-71 (arguing that filing should be a permitted way to
perfect a security interest in instruments). Thus, Revised section 9-331 provides that a filed
financing statement does not constitute notice that would preclude a purchaser from becoming a
holder in due course, and Revised section 9-330(d) provides that purchasers for value who take
possession of an instrument generally have priority over a security interest perfected by filing.
46. Parties to the Article 9 revision process found it difficult to differentiate loan
participations, which are typically undivided interests in loans, from other types of payment
intangibles. In the debate over this issue, I argued:
Few banks... comply with [the pre-UCC] common law requirements [for sales of loan
participations], which may involve obligor notification or "policing."... If a bank does
not comply, then its failure to file financing statements under Article 9, if it applied to
sales of loan participations, would put it in no worse position than at present. Banks
would take the insolvency risk of the selling bank, as they likely do now.
Schwarcz, supra note 23, at 956 n.165 (citation omitted). Nonetheless, the political heat of the
controversy overwhelmed rational inquiry. For a history of this controversy and its solution, see
Paul M. Shupack, Making Revised Article 9 Safe for Securitizations: A Brief History, 73 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 167 (1999).
47. See R. §§ 9-309(3), 9-310(b)(2).
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B. Priority
Priority refers to the ranking of multiple claims against a
transferred asset.48 In a securitization context, it means that "the SPVs
and investors' claims against the transferred financial assets are
superior [in ranking] to any third-party claims," including that of the
originator's trustee in bankruptcy. 49 Under Current Article 9, priority
is generally accorded to the first secured creditor to file or perfect,
under a rule usually referred to as "first in time, first in right."50
Revised Article 9 continues that rule.51
There is, however, one exception under Current Article 9 to first
in time, first in right. A holder of a purchase money security interest
("PMSI") generally takes priority over an earlier perfected security
interest in the same collateral.52 That exception, however, would
create a significant problem for securitization and other forms of
accounts receivable financing: because accounts are the proceeds of
inventory, it would mean that a later perfected inventory financier
with a PMSI would take priority over an earlier perfected SPV or
accounts financier. To ensure that the PMSI exception does not
discourage accounts receivable financing, Current Article 9 has a
special rule that favors accounts receivable financiers, including SPVs
that purchase accounts, over purchase money financiers of
inventory. 3 Revised Article 9 continues that special rule.54
III. REVISED ARTICLE 9 MITIGATES THE EFFECT OF COMMINGLING
OF PROCEEDS
Commingling refers to the mixing of proceeds of collateral with
assets of the originator. Under Current Article 9, in an "insolvency
48. See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 241.
49. See id.
50. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5).
51. See R. § 9-322(a)(1) (providing that "[c]onflicting perfected security interests ... rank
according to priority in time of filing or perfection"). For an interesting critique of this rule, see
ALAN SCHWARTZ & ROBERT E. SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 660, 664-65 (2d ed. 1991).
52 See U.C.C. § 9-312(3)-(4). Current UCC section 9-107 defines a PMSI as a security
interest "taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price" or
"taken by a person who by making advances ... gives value to enable the debtor to acquire
rights in or the use of collateral." The former is sometimes referred to as a "seller PMSI" and
the latter as a "lender PMSI." See Schwarcz, supra note 23, at 963.
53. UCC section 9-312(3), which governs a PMSI in inventory, fails to give the PMSI
priority over a conflicting security interest in accounts generated by such inventory. See also
U.C.C. § 9-312 cmt. 3.
54. See R. § 9-324(b).
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proceeding" (such as bankruptcy),55 the secured party or SPV's
interest in cash proceeds will be lost if the cash is commingled with
other funds of the originator, except to the extent that an artificial
formula preserves the security interest.56 However, this rule is unfair
to secured parties because it can arbitrarily limit the amount of a
perfected security interest in commingled cash proceeds and it allows
an originator contemplating bankruptcy, in what has become a
commonplace legal strategy for debtors, to intentionally commingle
proceeds of a perfected security interest in advance of filing a
bankruptcy petition in order to use the formula to defeat the
perfected interest.57
Revised Article 9 will remedy that unfairness. Rejecting the
artificial formula, it returns to the common law principles of
"tracing," under which a perfected security interest will continue in
traceable cash proceeds of the original collateral.5 8 This would permit
common law tracing rules such as the "lowest intermediate balance
rule," in which it is presumed that funds remaining in an account after
withdrawal by the debtor include the proceeds of collateral (or, put
another way, that withdrawals from a deposit account following the
deposit of proceeds are first made from non-proceeds)."9
Revised Article 9 also expands the definition of proceeds, which
currently includes only what "is received upon the sale, exchange,
collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds." 6 This
relatively narrow definition had created confusion, for example, as to
whether dividends of stock are proceeds.61 Under the expanded
55. See U.C.C. § 1-201(22) (defining "insolvency proceedings").
56. UCC section 9-306(4)(d)(ii) sets forth that formula.
57. See Schwarcz, supra note 23, at 957 (describing and commenting on that strategy).
58. See R. § 9-315(a)(2), (b)(2) (permitting the secured party to identify the proceeds "by a
method of tracing, including application of equitable principles, that is permitted under law
other than this article [9]").
59. For a more complete explanation of these tracing rules, see Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corp. v. Farmers Bank, 358 F. Supp. 317, 325-27 (E.D. Mo. 1973); and BARKLEY CLARK, THE
LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 10.03 (rev.
ed. 1993 & Supp. III 1999). Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 202 (1959) (similar rule
under trust law). The only problem, however, with rejection of the artificial formula of Current
section 9-306(4)(d)(ii) is that "the tracing/LIBR approach may be more difficult and expensive
to apply." PEB REPORT, supra note 45, at 124. For an approach that would combine the relative
simplicity of the artificial formula with the fairness of a tracing approach, see Schwarcz, supra
note 23, at 958.
60. U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (defining "proceeds").
61. See, e.g., FDIC v. Hastie (In re Hastie), 2 F.3d 1042, 1045-46 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding
that stock dividends do not constitute proceeds because the payment of dividends does not
constitute "an event whereby one asset is disposed of and another is acquired as its substitute,"
as contemplated by Current section 9-306(1)'s definition of proceeds). For a general analysis of
this case, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Rights, Preventing Windfalls: A Model for
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definition, stock dividends clearly would be included.62
This expanded definition of proceeds can have major significance
for securitization. Increasingly, the financial assets used in securitiza-
tion transactions represent rights to payment that arise in the future
("future assets"). If, however, the originator goes bankrupt after the
securitization transaction is entered into, section 552(a) of the Federal
Bankruptcy Code may cut off the SPV's interest in future assets.63
While section 552(b)(1) generally would preserve the SPV's interest
in future assets, that interest is only preserved to the extent that the
future assets constitute "proceeds, product, offspring, or profit[]" of
the SPV's prepetition assets.64 In this connection, courts interpret the
term "proceeds" by reference to the UCC definition.65 Thus, Revised
Article 9's expanded definition of proceeds will expand the universe
of future assets that can be sold to SPVs without the fear of the SPVs'
interest in those assets being cut off in the event of the originator's
bankruptcy.66
IV. REVISED ARTICLE 9 PROMOTES ASSIGNABILITY
NOTWITHSTANDING CONTRACTUAL RESTRICTION
Parties to contracts sometimes restrict the assignment of rights
and obligations thereunder.67 These restrictions are often referred to
Harmonizing State and Federal Laws on Floating Liens, 75 N.C. L. REV. 403, 441-45 (1997).
62. See R. § 9-102(a)(64) (defining proceeds to include not only "whatever is acquired
upon the sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition of collateral," but also (among other
things) "whatever is collected on, or distributed on account of, collateral," and "rights arising
out of collateral"). My example of stock dividends is illustrative; the reader should be aware
that Current section 9-306(1) was amended in 1994 specifically to provide that "[a]ny payments
or distributions made with respect to investment property collateral are proceeds."
63. Section 552(a) provides that "[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b) of this section,
property acquired by the estate or by the debtor after the commencement of the [bankruptcy]
case [post-petition] is not subject to any lien resulting from any security agreement entered into
by the debtor before the commencement of the case [prepetition]." 11 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1994). I
have argued, however, that section 552 should not cut off a prepetition sale of the right to post-
petition payments, such as a prepetition sale of future assets. See Schwarcz, supra note 61, at
456-58 (analyzing the tension between section 552 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code and UCC
section 9-204 (permitting "floating liens")).
64. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).
65. See, e.g., Unsecured Creditors Comm. v. Marepcon Fin. Corp. (In re Bumper Sales,
Inc.), 907 F.2d 1430, 1437 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that "the UCC's definition and treatment of
proceeds applies to Section 552 of the Bankruptcy Code").
66. The SPV's interest in those assets, in the event of the originator's bankruptcy,
nonetheless might be subject to the automatic stay in bankruptcy. See Schwarcz, supra note 61,
at 458. If the relevant transfer of future assets is not a true sale, the SPV's interest also may be
subject to the equitable powers of a bankruptcy judge. See id. at 458-61 (discussing judicial
interpretation of the equities exception in 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)).
67. For example, franchise agreements commonly restrict the right of either party to assign
the agreement or any right therein.
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as "anti-assignment clauses." In a securitization transaction, the
parties to that contract are the originator and a third party obligated
on the financial asset. Because the focus is on the originator's transfer
of its rights in the financial asset to an SPV, we need only examine the
obligor's ability to restrict that transfer.
Current Article 9 nullifies anti-assignment clauses that prohibit
"assignment of an account or ... creation of a security interest in a
general intangible for money due or to become due."68 The rationale
given is that the nullification of anti-assignment clauses "is widely
recognized in the cases and ... corresponds to current business
practices. '69 An implicit rationale, however, might be that the obligor
on the account or general intangible is not prejudiced by its
assignment,70 whereas enforcing the anti-assignment clause would
impair the free alienability of property rights.71
Revised Article 9 clarifies the rule of Current Article 9. First, the
revision eliminates any argument that a transfer of financial assets in
violation of an invalidated anti-assignment clause nonetheless
constitutes a breach as between the obligor and the originator. 71
Second, the revision treats anti-assignment clauses in payment
intangibles and promissory notes differently depending on whether
the transfer in question is a sale or merely a transfer for security.
Anti-assignment clauses would be ineffective in both cases from
preventing perfection of the transfer of the right to payment, 73 but
they would be upheld to prevent an originator from selling its
underlying business relationship. 74 Thus, if the originator is a bank
which has made a loan to a borrower, the bank could sell a
participation in that loan-a loan participation being a payment
intangible75-to an SPV or other third party and could perfect that
sale notwithstanding an anti-assignment clause in the underlying loan
68. U.C.C. § 9-318(4).
69. Id. § 9-318 cmt. 4. But note that non-UCC law sometimes upholds anti-assignment
clauses. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(2)(c) (1981).
70. Current section 9-318 protects the obligor from being prejudiced by the assignment.
71. A financial asset represents the originator's right to payment, and property, after all, is
merely a bundle of rights.
72. See R. §§ 9-406(d)(2), 9-408(a)(2) (providing that a transfer in violation of an anti-
assignment clause does not constitute a default).
73. See id. §§ 9-406(d), 9-408(a)-(b).
74. Revised section 9-408(d) effectively provides that, in the case of sales of payment
intangibles or promissory notes and in the case of any transfer of a health-care-insurance
receivable, anti-assignment clauses are ineffective to thwart perfection of the sale or other
transfer but may be effective for all other purposes.
75. See supra text accompanying note 17.
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agreement; but the bank could not alter the underlying debtor-
creditor relationship with its borrower. The buyer of the loan
participation therefore would have no direct collection rights against
the borrower.
V. REVISED ARTICLE 9 CLARIFIES THE EFFECT OF A NEGATIVE
PLEDGE COVENANT
A negative pledge covenant is an agreement by a debtor in favor
of a third party (typically, a creditor) in which the debtor agrees not
to grant a security interest in or otherwise encumber its assets.76 In a
securitization context, originators often make negative pledge
covenants in favor of SPVs regarding transferred and to-be-
transferred financial assets. If, of course, those financial assets already
have been sold to the SPV and the originator retains no interest
therein, the originator would have no power to grant a security
interest and a negative pledge covenant then would be superfluous.
But it is sometimes unclear whether the financial assets have been
sold; and originators often do retain interests, such as interests in
financial assets not yet sold, or undivided interests in financial assets
that have been sold, or rights to surplus collections. In those cases,
negative pledge covenants may be important.
Current Article 9 is unclear as to the enforceability of a negative
pledge covenant.77 Revised Article 9 offers clarity by providing that
while negative pledge covenants cannot restrict alienability, a transfer
of financial assets in breach of a negative pledge covenant
nonetheless constitutes a default by the originator. 78 That default
could entitle the SPV to exercise remedies against the originator and
76. Sometimes, the debtor agrees not to grant a security interest in its assets without
equally and ratably securing the creditor, in which case the negative pledge covenant is
commonly referred to as an "equal and ratable clause."
77. Current section 9-311 provides that "[t]he debtor's rights in collateral may be
voluntarily or involuntarily transferred ... notwithstanding a provision in the security
agreement prohibiting any transfer or making the transfer constitute a default." It is uncertain
whether this means that negative pledge covenants are unenforceable or merely that negative
pledge covenants cannot restrict the transfer but the transfer nonetheless constitutes a breach of
the covenant.
78. Revised section 9-401(b) provides that "[an agreement between the debtor and
secured party which prohibits a transfer of the debtor's rights in collateral or makes the transfer
a default does not prevent the transfer from taking effect." Comment 5 explains that if, in
violation of a negative pledge covenant, the debtor "purports to grant a security interest in the
same collateral to another secured party[,] [s]ubsection (b) validates [the] creation of the
subsequent (prohibited) security interest.... However .... subsection (b) does not provide that
the [negative pledge covenant] itself is 'ineffective.' Consequently, the debtor's breach may
create a default."
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might also allow the SPV to sue the transferee, if it knew or should
have known of the breached covenant, for tortious interference with
contract.
CONCLUSION
The revision of Article 9 does much to bring the commercial law
setting for securitization into the twenty-first century by embracing a
broader range of financial assets, setting clear and pragmatic rules for
perfection and priority of their transfer, clarifying inadvertent legal
ambiguities, and reducing unnecessary transaction costs.

